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THE DELIBERATIVE-PRIVACY PRINCIPLE: ABORTION,
FREE SPEECH, AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
B. Jessie Hill*
INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I propose that there is a deep connection among at least three
seemingly disparate types of constitutional rights claims. Those three rights claims are
the right to make the abortion decision for any reason one chooses,1 the right against
compelled ideological speech,2 and the right of religious institutions to freely hire and
fire their ministers (also known as the “ministerial exception”).3 In particular, there is
a thread that unites all of these types of claims. That unifying thread is the concept
of deliberative privacy. I use the term “privacy” in a specific sense, which will be de-
scribed in more detail below.4
The connection among these rights claims has not been previously made explicit
by courts or commentators. One goal of this Article, then, is simply to reveal this
underlying connection among constitutional rights. The other goal is to analyze the
implications of considering all of these rights claims in relation to one another and
as sharing a particular normative underpinning.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes each of the three constitutional
rights claims in more detail and demonstrates that a shared concept of privacy under-
lies each of them. Then, Part II analyzes the nature of the privacy concept in greater
depth and considers its implications for constitutional doctrine.
I. THREE TYPES OF CLAIMS
This Part describes the three different types of claims, all of which implicate a
certain kind of privacy interest. As discussed further below, all three are claims to
a right to make a particular decision or take a particular action for any reason one
chooses. In this Article, I characterize this right as a sort of deliberative-privacy right,
which is in essence a right against governmental “mind control.” It protects against
governmental intrusion into protected deliberative processes.
* Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Judge Ben C. Green Professor
of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I would like to thank Tim Zick and
the participants in this Symposium for helpful feedback on this Article.
1 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 888
F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 2018).
2 See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
3 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 181 (2012).
4 I also note that there may be additional rights claims that rely upon this concept of privacy,
in exactly the sense the term is used here. I do not mean to suggest that the three types of claims
described here constitute an exhaustive list, but rather that they constitute an illustrative one.
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A. Freedom to Terminate a Pregnancy Pre-viability for Any Reason
In the past several years, states have passed laws that make it a crime to termi-
nate a pregnancy, at any stage of the pregnancy,5 for various forbidden reasons—
such as fetal anomaly, or the sex or race of the fetus. For example, an Arizona law
passed in 2011 prohibits an abortion if “the abortion is sought based on the sex or race
of the child or the race of a parent” of the fetus.6 Ohio’s law singles out Down syn-
drome as a forbidden reason for terminating a pregnancy.7 Because these reason-based
abortion bans are of relatively recent vintage, there are only two federal appeals
court cases addressing their constitutionality.8 In Planned Parenthood of Indiana &
Kentucky, Inc. v. Commissioner of Indiana State Department of Health, the Seventh
Circuit struck down Indiana’s law forbidding abortions for reasons of fetal anomaly
or the sex or race of the fetus.9 The Sixth Circuit similarly struck down Ohio’s
reason-based ban in Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes.10
5 See Carolyn Jacobs Chachkin, What Potent Blood: Non-Invasive Prenatal Genetic Di-
agnosis and the Transformation of Modern Prenatal Care, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 9, 11 (2007)
(describing prenatal genetic testing, which can detect possible fetal anomalies in the first tri-
mester of pregnancy).
6 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02 (LexisNexis 2019).
7 Specifically, the law provides:
No person shall purposely perform or induce or attempt to perform or
induce an abortion on a pregnant woman if the person has knowledge that
the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion, in whole or in part, because
of any of the following:
(1) A test result indicating Down syndrome in an unborn child;
(2) A prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome in an unborn child;
(3) Any other reason to believe that an unborn child has Down
syndrome.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.10(B) (LexisNexis 2018). This law, which was passed in 2017,
is currently enjoined. Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 294 F. Supp. 3d 746, 749 (S.D. Ohio 2018),
appeal docketed, No. 18-3329 (6th Cir. Apr. 12, 2018). Note that Ohio’s law, like most if not
all criminal abortion restrictions, is written as a prohibition that applies to the doctor providing
the abortion rather than the woman seeking it. Nonetheless, it is evident that the law is aimed
at controlling the woman’s decision, by making abortion unavailable when the doctor knows she
is seeking it for a particular reason.
8 A challenge to Arizona’s law, which was brought by the NAACP and the National Asian
Pacific American Women’s Forum, was dismissed for lack of standing. NAACP v. Horne, 626
F. App’x 200, 201 (9th Cir. 2015).
9 888 F.3d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 727 F.
App’x 208 (7th Cir. 2018), vacated, 917 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2018), and opinion reinstated,
917 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part, judgment rev’d in part on other grounds
sub nom. Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780 (2019). In Box, the
U.S. Supreme Court summarily reversed the Seventh Circuit’s decision on a different issue—
pertaining to an Indiana law regulating the disposition of fetal tissue—but denied certiorari
on the issue of the constitutionality of Indiana’s reason-based ban. Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1780.
10 Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, No. 18-3229 (6th Cir. Oct. 11, 2019).
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The Seventh Circuit’s decision was deceptively straightforward. Since the Indiana
law banned abortions before viability, it would seem to be an obvious violation of
the rule, announced in Roe v. Wade,11 reformulated in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,12 and reaffirmed repeatedly since then by the U.S.
Supreme Court that the state may regulate but may not ban abortion before fetal
viability.13 Not all judges agreed with this assessment, however, which was also
disputed by the state. The State of Indiana, in defending the law, argued that the
Indiana law “represent[ed] a ‘qualitatively new type of abortion regulation,’ and that
[the state] has compelling interests in prohibiting discrimination of particular fetuses
in light of technological advances in genetic screening.”14 The U.S. Supreme Court
has never considered the constitutionality of a law just like this one, banning abortions
when they are sought for a particular reason.15 Thus, the law’s defenders have sug-
gested, a framework other than the “undue burden” test set forth in Casey must be
applied—such as strict scrutiny.16
11 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (holding that the state may ban abortion only after viability).
12 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (reaffirming the “right of the woman to choose to have an
abortion before viability” and holding that “[b]efore viability, the State’s interests are not
strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle
to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure”).
13 See, e.g., Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016) (“[A]
provision of law is constitutionally invalid, if the ‘purpose or effect’ of the provision ‘is to
place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus
attains viability.’” (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878)).
14 Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 888 F.3d at 307; cf. Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1792
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“Whatever else might be said about Casey, it did not decide whether
the Constitution requires States to allow eugenic abortions.”). Alternate arguments have also
been put forward in support of reason-based bans. In Planned Parenthood of Indiana &
Kentucky, Inc., the state argued that the Indiana law lay outside the core prohibitions of Roe
and Casey, because those cases protect only a “binary choice” to choose abortion or to carry
a particular pregnancy to term, not a right to abort a particular fetus depending on the fetus’s
characteristics. 888 F.3d at 306–07. In addition, in a case involving an Ohio law banning
abortions due to fetal Down syndrome, the state suggested that courts have upheld laws that
may be characterized as pre-viability abortion bans. Brief of Defendants-Appellants Lance
Himes, Kim G. Rothermel, & Bruce R. Saferin at 45, Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, No. 18-
3329 (6th Cir. June 22, 2018), 2018 WL 3109485, at *45 [hereinafter Brief of Defendants-
Appellants]. As Joseph Blocher has recently argued, it may be difficult in some instances to
determine whether a law is truly a “ban,” and the label itself is highly manipulable. Joseph
Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 25–26), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3353911.
15 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of
Health, 917 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 2018) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“None of the Court’s
abortion decisions holds that states are powerless to prevent abortions designed to choose the
sex, race, and other attributes of children.”).
16 Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 888 F.3d at 314 (Manion, J., dissenting) (applying
strict scrutiny); see also Brief of Defendants-Appellants, supra note 14, at 42 (arguing that
the Ohio reason-based abortion ban should be judged by, “at most,” strict scrutiny).
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The laws’ opponents, by contrast, insist that such restrictions, although perhaps
in some sense novel, strike at the very heart of the constitutional right to choose abor-
tion and therefore are not only unconstitutional but per se unconstitutional.17 They
commandeer the woman’s private decision-making process in a way that is funda-
mentally incompatible with recognition of a constitutional privacy right—a right to
autonomous decision-making.18 Essentially, laws regulating reasons why an abortion
may or may not be sought reach into women’s minds, interfere with their most inti-
mate deliberations, and tell them what reasons for this private action are acceptable
or not in the eyes of the state.19 Courts have, so far, also accepted this reasoning.20
The opponents’ view has considerable support in the case law. The language of
Roe itself is explicit in stating that it is the woman’s “decision” that merits Fourteenth
Amendment protection, and that she must be permitted to engage in consultation
with her physician to make that decision.21 Thus, in the words of one scholar, “[t]he
existence and recognition of this constitutional right means that the choice whether
to exercise it—including the reasons why—ultimately belongs to the pregnant woman
when the decision is hers to make”; she has a right to make it “‘without public scru-
tiny and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign or other third parties.’”22
This understanding of the constitutional privacy right implies that Casey’s undue-
burden framework for analyzing the constitutionality of abortion restrictions is an-
cillary to the primary question courts are meant to answer. The key question, under
the Fourteenth Amendment, is whether a particular abortion restriction prevents a
woman from making the “ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viabil-
ity.”23 The undue-burden framework, which asks whether a law has the purpose or
effect of imposing “a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking” a pre-
viability abortion, is simply a way of determining whether the opportunity to make
the ultimate decision has been taken away from her.24
17 B. Jessie Hill, Regulating Reasons: Governmental Regulation of Private Deliberation
in Reproductive Decision-Making, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES
348, 348–52 (Holly Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., 2017).
18 See, e.g., id.; Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path
to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 387 (2008).
19 See Hill, supra note 17, at 349–55.
20 Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes, 294 F. Supp. 3d 746, 754–55 (S.D. Ohio 2018) (treating the
right as categorical and striking down Ohio’s law without engaging in undue-burden analysis),
aff’d, 940 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2019).
21 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v.
Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 699 F.3d 962, 987 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that the abortion
right is, in part, “a constitutionally protected interest ‘in making certain kinds of important deci-
sions’ free from governmental compulsion” (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977))).
22 Marc Spindelman, On the Constitutionality of Ohio’s “Down Syndrome Abortion Ban,”
79 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 19, 38 (2018) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655
(1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)).
23 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
24 Id. at 877, 879.
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B. The Right Against Compelled Ideological Speech
Despite the expansiveness of the First Amendment right to free speech,25 it is
possible to identify at least one truly core aspect of that right: the right to be free from
compelled ideological speech, exemplified in cases such as West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette.26 Barnette is almost self-consciously written to be a canonical
First Amendment case, declaring that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to con-
fess by word or act their faith therein.”27 As Professor Timothy Zick has explained,
Barnette, which in fact drew on both the free-speech and the free-exercise aspects of the
First Amendment, “establish[es] a broad anti-orthodoxy principle.”28 Thus, Barnette
places the concept of “freedom of mind” at the center of First Amendment doctrine.29
Since Barnette was decided, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the
principle that individuals cannot be compelled to promote a government-prescribed
ideological message. Thus, Wooley v. Maynard, in which the Supreme Court struck
down a New Hampshire law requiring drivers’ license plates to carry the state motto
(which was, ironically, “Live Free or Die”), quotes the “freedom of mind” language
from Barnette and opines that the law “invades the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from
all official control.”30 This language suggests not only that the Free Speech Clause31
protects against compelled ideological speech, but that this protection is at the very
center or core of the First Amendment.32 Indeed, in a different context, the Court
25 See generally Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1199, 1200 (2015) (discussing how “the First Amendment’s territory pushes outward to
encompass ever more areas of law”).
26 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
27 Id.
28 TIMOTHY ZICK, THE DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE: FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION
TO OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 130 (2018). One can also see the interrelatedness of free
speech and free exercise principles relating in cases such as Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, in which the baker asserted that creating a cake for a same-
sex wedding, in violation of his religious beliefs, violated both his right to free exercise of
religion and his right against compelled speech, largely for identical reasons. 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1723 (2018).
29 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
30 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1977).
31 “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
32 Some scholars have articulated different rationales and interests served by the pro-
hibition on compelled speech, including compelled ideological speech. For example, the case
law is driven partly by a concern with avoiding “misattribution,” or giving a false impression
of someone’s views to the outside world. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, (Mis)attribution, 87 DENV.
U. L. REV. 833, 839–40 (2010); Abner S. Greene, “Not in My Name” Claims of Constitutional
Right, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1475, 1525 (2018).
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asserted: “At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person
should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression,
consideration, and adherence.”33
As noted above, the free-speech right against compelled ideological speech shares
an affiliation with other aspects of the First Amendment—especially the Free Exer-
cise Clause.34 In fact, the famous “fixed star” quote from Barnette refers not simply
to a bedrock principle of the First Amendment, but more generally to the “constitu-
tional constellation” itself—lending credence to the notion that the right against
governmental interference in private deliberation is a more general constitutional
principle—one that underlies numerous constitutional provisions.35 For this reason,
too, the Supreme Court observed in Rochin v. California, the case holding that
pumping a suspect’s stomach for evidence was a conscience-shocking violation of
Due Process, that “[i]t would be a stultification of the responsibility which the course
of constitutional history has cast upon this Court to hold that in order to convict a
man the police cannot extract by force what is in his mind but can extract what is in
his stomach.”36 In other words, the principle that the state cannot reach into individu-
als’ minds in a coercive manner was already well-established, even prior to the right
to bodily integrity.
C. The Ministerial Exception and the Protection for Religious Belief
The ministerial exception is a rule derived from both the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause37 of the First Amendment, providing that ministerial
employees are barred from suing their religious institutions for at least some em-
ployment-related claims, such as wrongful discharge and violations of civil rights
laws pertaining to hiring, firing, and other employment actions.38 In other words, the
religious institution is constitutionally entitled freely “to choose those who will guide
it on its way,” and therefore antidiscrimination laws do not apply to decisions about
33 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
34 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
35 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
36 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
37 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
38 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 181 (2012)
(“Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the decision of a religious
group to fire one of its ministers.”); see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of
Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1265, 1282 (2017) (“First and foremost, the [ministerial] exception forecloses
judicial inquiry into the criteria that religious communities use to measure eligibility for posi-
tions involving communication of the faith. For some traditional communities, these criteria
include sex, but they might also include marital status, sexual orientation, age, education, experi-
ence, ancestry, or even race.”).
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hiring, firing, and promotion.39 Though long applied by lower courts, the ministerial
exception was officially recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2012 decision
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC.40
The constitutional doctrine of the ministerial exception may appear to be some-
what different from the other doctrines discussed in this Part. It does not seem to be
a true “privacy” right, in the sense of protecting individual autonomy to make private
decisions about matters that are central to one’s personhood, dignity, or identity.
Structurally, however, ministerial exception claims resemble compelled-speech claims
and claims to be free from reason-based abortion bans in some important respects.
The ministerial exception protects a right to collective or institutional decision-making,
rather than individual decision-making. Although it may be problematic to do so,
the ministerial exception essentially treats churches and other religious employers
like individuals who must be free to make certain individual decisions in order to
maintain their identity.41
The logic and structure of the ministerial exception suggest either that the church
is a sort of private domain, immune from governmental interference, or that the reasons
that go into ministerial employment decisions are the sort of decisions that should be
protected by a constitutional privacy right.42 The latter view has arguably been em-
braced by Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle. They contend that Hosanna-Tabor
is a manifestation of the long-standing principle that the government has no power to
resolve ecclesiastical questions.43 The rule that the state is not competent to adjudi-
cate specifically religious questions, which is undergirded by anti-establishment and
free exercise principles, is a long-standing and relatively uncontroversial one.44 The
fact that the ministerial exception implicates this rule is explained by Lupu and Tuttle
as follows:
“Courts cannot decide whether a congregation has engaged in dis-
criminatory conduct toward a ministerial employee without first
determining a set of qualifications for holding the role, or a stan-
dard of performance within the role, and then measuring the
employee’s conduct . . . against these standards. Such acts of mea-
surement are beyond the state’s adjudicative competence.” If civil
39 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196.
40 Id.
41 For critiques of the ministerial exception, see, for example, B. Jessie Hill, Change, Dissent,
and the Problem of Consent in Religious Organizations, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY (Chad Flanders et al. eds., 2016); Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Con-
stitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1965 (2007).
42 See Hill, supra note 41, at 419 n.2, 439; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 38, at 1281.
43 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 38, at 1282.
44 Id. at 1282 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1871)).
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courts were free to invalidate decisions made by religious authori-
ties under these circumstances, the courts would be substituting
the judgment of the state for that of the religious community with
respect to the role and content of ministry.45
Because ministerial hiring and firing decisions are inherently religious in nature,
then, they cannot be examined by courts without running afoul of this principle.46
The notion that the right to private decision-making protected by the ministerial
exception is a kind of privacy right may also reflect the exception’s relationship to
the free exercise right, which protects religious individuals’ religiously motivated
conduct, as well as their beliefs.47 While the constitutional protection for the former
has at times been put into question, the constitutional protection for the latter—for
religious beliefs themselves—has never been doubted.48 While religious employers
engage in religiously motivated conduct in hiring and firing ministerial employees,
they also engage in religiously motivated reasoning in making those hiring and
firing decisions.49 For this reason, courts may not even examine protected religious
employers’ asserted reasons for an employment decision to determine whether they
are pretextual.50 They must instead simply dismiss the lawsuit if the hiring or firing
decision is found to be one involving a ministerial employee, in which the ministe-
rial exception is properly invoked.51
Alternatively, it is possible to conceive of the entire religious institution as a sort
of private domain that is protected from governmental interference. Although this con-
cept may seem extreme, some scholars have suggested that religious institutions
should be viewed as possessing the kind of sovereignty possessed by sovereign na-
tions, such that the government presumptively lacks jurisdiction to interfere in their
affairs.52 Though less akin to the concept of a privacy right to autonomous deliberation,
45 Id. at 1283–84 (quoting Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congrega-
tions: Disputes Between Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
119, 144 (2009)).
46 See also Hill, supra note 17, at 353 (discussing the private nature of religious deliberation).
47 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524
(1993).
48 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (“[W]hile [laws] cannot
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”).
49 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 194–95
(2012).
50 Id. (“The purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a
minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead ensures that the
authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical,’
is the church’s alone.” (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church
in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952))).
51 Id. at 173.
52 Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Conception of Church Autonomy, in THE RISE OF
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 19, 21–22 (Chad Flanders et al. eds., 2016). For critiques
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this notion of the religious institution as a separate sphere that is presumptively im-
mune from government interference also seems to demarcate a zone of privacy.53 One
might analogize to Griswold v. Connecticut, in which the Court held that a law pro-
hibiting the use of contraception violated the privacy right of married persons to make
childbearing decisions just as it simultaneously and relatedly violated the sanctity of
a private space—the marital bedroom.54 The bedroom is thus a metaphor for a sov-
ereign and sacred space of procreative decision-making that the state cannot enter.
D. What Kind of Privacy Right?
Having described three sets of cases involving three different kinds of rights claims,
it is now possible to identify and characterize the thread that unites them. Each of these
rights claims is comprised in part of a claim to be free from governmental interfer-
ence in private decision-making—a claim that is often considered synonymous with
the constitutional privacy right protected by the doctrine of substantive due process.55
Indeed, in one sense the above description does suggest a deep affiliation of all of these
constitutional rights with the concept of privacy that is most familiar from reproduc-
tive rights jurisprudence. At the same time, however, the concept of privacy that unites
these three strands of doctrine is not necessarily coextensive with the privacy right
as it has been recognized in cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut56 and Roe v. Wade.57
Further specification is required to understand the precise nature of this privacy right.
This privacy right is referred to in this Article as a “deliberative-privacy” right, in order
to distinguish it from the privacy right protected under the Due Process Clause, while
still recognizing its relationship to that right.
The concept that underlies the three strands of doctrine described above is that
there is a deep-seated constitutional protection against the government invading and
commandeering individuals’ minds. The individual’s mind and mental processes are
seen as a sort of sovereign space in which the state has no jurisdiction. As discussed
further below, this right is treated as a sort of special protection, a “core” liberty,
governed by per se rules. It appears to be protected because of the effect that gov-
ernment commandeering of individuals’ thought processes have on individual dignity
and personhood. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, for example, the plurality explained
that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence,
of this view, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 38, at 1297–99; Richard Schragger & Micah
Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917, 936 (2013).
53 See Smith, supra note 52, at 21, 26.
54 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts
of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive
to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”).
55 Cf. Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 715, 739–41
(2010) (noting that in political discourse, the “right to privacy” is basically synonymous with
the right to choose abortion).
56 381 U.S. 479; see also supra note 52 accompanying text.
57 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also supra note 18 accompanying text.
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of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.”58 Similarly, in the context of compelled speech, the Court
has explained that “[f]orcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they
find objectionable is always demeaning . . . .”59 In strikingly similar terms, Professor
Seana Shiffrin has described the harm of compelled speech as comprising “the illicit
influence compelled speech may have on the character and autonomous thinking
process of the compelled speaker . . . .”60 In Shiffrin’s view, being forced to mouth
a message with which one disagrees may ultimately affect the individual’s own
deliberative process and moral reasoning.61
Unquestionably, too, the rights discussed above are interrelated on a profound
level. Religious or spiritual considerations may play a part in the decision whether
to terminate a pregnancy after a fetal anomaly diagnosis. Speech that the state seeks
to compel may have religious implications for the individual, as it did in Barnette—
a case that is often understood as being about both religious freedom and free
speech62—or in the more recent case of National Institute of Family and Life Advo-
cates v. Becerra, in which nonprofit crisis pregnancy centers claimed that their free
speech rights were infringed by speech mandates that violated their religious beliefs.63
This interrelationship, too, suggests a sort of deeper, procrustean privacy right that
undergirds the constitutional structure of the right against compelled speech, the right
against reason-based abortion bans, and the ministerial exception.64
A caveat is in order, however. In the area of reproductive decision-making auto-
nomy, the Supreme Court has nonetheless left some room for the state to involve itself
in individuals’ private decisions. For example, the Court has repeatedly acknowledged
that the state may express a preference for childbirth over abortion.65 And courts have
almost universally upheld even highly ideological and intrusive informational mandates
for women seeking abortions, all in the name of providing informed consent.66 Such
58 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
59 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464
(2018).
60 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW.
U. L. REV. 839, 840 (2005).
61 Shiffrin argues that this effect is achieved partly through the “surreptitious influence
on one’s thoughts that rote recitations may exert over time” and partly through the cognitive
dissonance that arises from being forced to behave insincerely when one espouses statements
with which one does not agree. Id. at 859–63.
62 See ZICK, supra note 28, at 130.
63 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368–70 (2018).
64 As noted above, this list of rights should not be taken as exclusive. One could point to
other rights claims, such as the rights of parents to make decisions about the care and custody
of their children, that partake of a similar structure. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 72–73 (2000).
65 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992).
66 Id.; see, e.g., EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 424–35
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mandates have included ultrasound procedures in which the person performing the
ultrasound is required to describe the fetal anatomy and make the fetal cardiac activity
visible or audible; and a requirement that women be told they are about to terminate
the life of a “whole, separate, unique, living human being.”67 In deciding that such
information is “relevant” to the woman’s abortion decision, the state is necessarily
deciding what sorts of “inputs” should go into her decision.68 Yet, courts appear to draw
the line, at least, at measures that attempt to direct the “output” of women’s decision-
making processes—such as by making certain reasons for terminating a pregnancy
illegal.69 Thus, “much as [courts] may appear to accept a role for the state in encourag-
ing deliberation, the structure and logic of the decisional privacy right run counter
to the notion that the government may actually control or commandeer the reasoning
process.”70 In the context of the ministerial exception and compelled speech, the
protection may be even greater; the case law generally does not support the notion that
the government can force individuals to listen to it before deciding what to say, or
to consider particular ideas when making hiring and firing decisions with respect to
religious ministers.71
II. THE NATURE AND IMPLICATIONS OF DELIBERATIVE-PRIVACY CLAIMS
This Part aims to examine more closely the nature and implications of the sort
of privacy claims described in Part I. As discussed in Section II.A, one particularly
striking feature of all the above claims is that they are treated as categorical rights—
rights that are not subject to balancing against any state interests and that, instead,
are protected by per se rules of invalidity. Section II.B then considers the implica-
tions of taking the underlying deliberative-privacy right seriously and protecting it
(6th Cir. 2019); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735 (8th
Cir. 2008) (en banc). But see Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014) (striking
down such a requirement).
67 EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., 920 F.3d at 430; Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735.
68 See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 734–36; see also CAROL SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION: TER-
MINATING PREGNANCY IN TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY AMERICA 110–20 (2017).
69 See Hill, supra note 17, at 351–52.
70 Id. at 352. Indeed, at least one court has struck down an ultrasound mandate in the
abortion context because it not only required that the ultrasound technician provide certain
information, but also because it did not permit the woman to decline the information—at least
not without going to great lengths to physically block out the information by covering her ears
and eyes. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 242. This suggests that the Fourth Circuit court would draw the
line at forcing women to consider certain information, though the state may require that
women be offered that information. A recent case from the Sixth Circuit, however, rejects
this distinction. See EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., 920 F.3d at 436.
71 See, e.g., Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., 882 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2018);
DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878, 887 (Wis. 2012); see also Sanger,
supra note 18, at 387–91.
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explicitly. I suggest that the deliberative-privacy right, once recognized, has a tendency
to expand, which could ultimately result in undesirable consequences.
A. Deliberative Privacy as a Categorical Right
Categorical rights are uncommon beasts in U.S. constitutional law. Most con-
stitutional rights are subject to various forms of balancing against state interests, in
which the state’s reasons for passing a law and the degree to which the law advances
those interests are weighed against the burden on the individual’s right. The nature
of the balancing—whether it takes the form of strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny,
rational basis scrutiny, or something else—depends on the particular right claimed
to be infringed and its position within the constitutional hierarchy.72 Thus, a claim
that the government is penalizing private speech based upon its content generally
invokes strict scrutiny,73 whereas a simple time, place, or manner restriction on speech
would invoke only a form of intermediate scrutiny.74 This distinction reflects the
notion that the interests to be served by the Free Speech Clause are more directly
burdened by a content-based restriction than by most content-neutral, time-place-
manner restrictions, and therefore that content-based restrictions are more threatening
to constitutional norms than content-neutral ones.75 But the deliberative-privacy right
is protected by a per se rule. As such, even the strongest, most compelling government
interests cannot justify or validate the government intruding into and commandeer-
ing the individual’s deliberative mental process. Courts have already recognized the
categorical nature of this deliberative-privacy right, albeit without always making
that nature explicit. For example, while the Supreme Court has not expressly called
the ministerial exception a categorical right or protection, it used categorical terms
in describing the doctrine. In particular, the Court explained, “The case before us is
an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her
church’s decision to fire her. Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars
such a suit.”76 The Court did not mention or apply any level of scrutiny or describe
any conditions under which the church’s interest in choosing its minsters might be
outweighed by the state’s interests.77 In fact, given that the ministerial exception pro-
vides an exception to antidiscrimination laws, it seems self-evident that interests
72 See Blocher, supra note 14, at 3.
73 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 118 (1991).
74 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
75 Cf. Blocher, supra note 14, at 37 (arguing that “bans” are laws, “subject to per se inval-
idity,” that are judged to significantly impair the interests at the heart of a particular constitu-
tional provision).
76 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196
(2012) (Thomas, J., concurring).
77 See id. at 176–96.
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normally considered compelling, such as eradicating race discrimination, could not
trump the privilege.78 Indeed, scholars have observed that the Court avoided apply-
ing any particular mode of scrutiny in Hosanna-Tabor, inferring that the rule is
therefore categorical.79
The categorical depiction of the ministerial exception evokes a long-standing
though by no means uncontroversial understanding of the rule as one that is quasi-
jurisdictional in nature—meaning that the state has no authority to intervene in the
internal decision-making of a religious institution, and therefore balancing state interests
against private interests would be altogether inappropriate.80 Although the Supreme
Court in Hosanna-Tabor declined to embrace this specific view, commentators have
nonetheless argued that “the rule is . . . best understood as a ‘jurisdictional’ doctrine”
in that it constrains that power of the state to regulate at all in a particular realm, and
it constitutes a threshold question limiting the ability of courts to examine the facts
behind a ministerial employment decision.81 Indeed, Hosanna-Tabor made clear that
78 See, e.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2006) (dismissing
a minister’s claim of sex discrimination under Title VII based on the ministerial exception).
79 B. Jessie Hill, Kingdom Without End? The Inevitable Expansion of Religious Sovereignty
Claims, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1177, 1198 (2017); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
#MeToo Meets the Ministerial Exception: Sexual Harassment Claims by Clergy and the First
Amendment’s Religion Clauses, 25 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 249, 301–02
n.435 (2019) (“Hosanna-Tabor relies considerably on the Establishment Clause as a bar to
judicial decision of ecclesiastical questions. Accordingly and wisely, the Court avoids ‘strict scru-
tiny’ or any other method of interest balancing in such cases.”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note
38, at 1301 (“The bar on state decisions of ecclesiastical questions has never included interest
balancing in any context, ministerial exception or otherwise.”). Notably, the Supreme Court
has also used categorical language when describing the constitutional protection for religious
belief (as opposed to religiously motivated conduct). In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court stated that a law specifically targeting religious beliefs “is
never permissible.” 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993) (emphasis added).
80 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 38, at 1291 (“Hosanna-Tabor extended a very longstanding
recognition that the Constitution precludes judicial determination of ecclesiastical questions.”).
81 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4 (“We conclude that the exception operates as an
affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar.”). But see Richard
W. Garnett & John M. Robinson, Hosanna-Tabor, Religious Freedom, and the Constitutional
Structure, 2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 307, 327 (arguing the ministerial exception is best under-
stood as a jurisdictional doctrine). In this way, the ministerial exception defense is unlike other
exemption claims, such as those raised by religious companies or individuals who do not wish
to comply with certain antidiscrimination laws. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018) (considering the claim of a religious baker
to be exempted from a public accommodations law requiring him to create wedding cakes for
same-sex couples); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (uphold-
ing the right of a closely held corporation to deny contraceptive coverage to its employees on
religious grounds, despite the requirement of the Affordable Care Act). In those cases, the
claimants simply seek exemption from the antidiscrimination law on religious grounds and do
not claim that the government is powerless to examine their reasons for not wishing to provide
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the reasons behind an employment decision may not be challenged, even as being
pretextual—thus affirming that once the exception is found to apply, courts have no
power to inquire further.82
To be fair, this categorical understanding of the ministerial exception has not
been universal. Some courts have instead suggested that strict scrutiny applies to
ministerial exception claims and have indeed even found in favor of the individual
challenging application of the exception under that balancing test. For example, in
Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that the application of antidiscrimination law to a claim by a
Roman Catholic novice that he was sexually harassed by his superiors, resulting in
constructive discharge must satisfy strict scrutiny.83 However, even that case acknowl-
edged that “[s]ome religious interests under the Free Exercise Clause are so strong
that no compelling state interest justifies government intrusion into the ecclesiastical
sphere.”84 In fact, Bollard may best be read as concluding simply that the sexual
harassment claim at issue did not fall within the scope of the categorical ministerial
exception, and for that reason it was subject to balancing.85 By contrast, if the case
had involved the religious institution’s “choice of representative,” the court stated
that it “would simply defer [to that choice] without further inquiry.”86
Similarly, though less obviously, the Supreme Court has generally given certain
types of compelled-speech claims categorical treatment. When the compelled speech
is political or ideological in nature, the Court has simply assumed unconstitutionality
without applying any sort of balancing test. Thus, in Janus, the Court hypothesized:
Suppose, for example, that the State of Illinois required all resi-
dents to sign a document expressing support for a particular set
of positions on controversial public issues—say, the platform of
one of the major political parties. No one, we trust, would seri-
ously argue that the First Amendment permits this.87
a particular good or service. I have argued elsewhere, however, that these “true” exemption
claims are starting to converge with ministerial exception claims, especially given courts’ hesi-
tation to examine religious individuals’ assertions about their beliefs and what their beliefs
require. See Hill, supra note 79, at 1192.
82 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194–95.
83 196 F.3d 940, 946–48 (9th Cir. 1999).
84 Id. at 946.
85 Id. at 947–48.
86 Id. at 947. At least one prominent scholar of law and religion has also argued that strict
scrutiny is the appropriate framework for all sorts of autonomy claims asserted by religious
institutions. See Michael A. Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, Implied Consent, and the Value
of Voluntarism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 579–80 (2015).
87 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463–
64 (2018).
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The Court’s confident assertion was not accompanied by the application of any bal-
ancing test or the mention of any state interests.88 In making this categorical asser-
tion, the Court might have been recalling the famous “fixed star” language from
Barnette, explaining that the state may not prescribe any orthodoxy, which the Court
had quickly followed up with the observation that “[i]f there are any circumstances
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.”89 In other words, there are
no state interests that might outweigh the interest in avoiding state-compelled
ideological speech.
Nonetheless, as is true of the ministerial exception, the Court has not always
made it entirely clear that compelled ideological speech is barred by a per se rule.
While suggesting that its rule was categorical (i.e., not subject to balancing), the
Barnette Court also stated in passing that “involuntary affirmation could be com-
manded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence”—thus
suggesting that some state interest might exist to justify a compelled flag salute.90
In Wooley v. Maynard, too, the Court appeared to apply strict scrutiny, examining
the asserted justifications for the New Hampshire law requiring drivers to carry a
state-sponsored message on their license plates.91 The Court first noted that the
state’s interest in having an identifiable license plate did not explain the need for the
particular message required by the state; it was therefore insufficiently tailored to
the state motto requirement.92 Indeed, this argument seemed not to answer the
plaintiff’s compelled-speech claim at all.93 With respect to the need for drivers to
display a specific, ideologically charged message, however, the Court’s language
became more categorical: “[W]here the State’s interest is to disseminate an ideol-
ogy, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individ-
ual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.”94
Thus, an interest in compelling speech by private individuals that is ideological in
nature must be rejected out of hand and individuals must remain free to reject state-
sponsored ideological messages.95 Likewise, in Janus the Court did ultimately apply
a balancing test—an “exacting scrutiny” standard slightly less demanding than strict
88 See id.
89 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
90 Id. at 633.
91 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977).
92 Id. at 716–17 (“Even were we to credit the State’s reasons and ‘even though the gov-
ernmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving
the same basic purpose.’” (footnotes omitted)).
93 See id. at 715–17.
94 Id. at 717.
95 See Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening,
89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 977–80 (2009).
422 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:407
scrutiny—but made it clear that this standard applies in the context of compelled
monetary subsidies for speech in the employment context, which are similar to, but
somewhat less troubling than, compelled speech itself.96
Finally, in the cases decided to date dealing with the constitutionality of reason-
based abortion bans, the courts have, in fact, been explicit in applying a per se rule.
For example, in the Indiana case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
the woman’s “right to terminate her pregnancy prior to viability is categorical: ‘a
State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate
her pregnancy before viability.’”97 Putting an even finer point on it, the Ohio district
court in Preterm-Cleveland v. Himes stated, “The interest protected by the Due Process
Clause is a woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy pre-viability, and
that right is categorical. The State cannot dictate what factors a woman is permitted
to consider in making her choice.”98 Because of this categorical conception, states’
attempts to cast reason-based abortion bans as antidiscrimination measures, serving
vital state interests in prohibiting discrimination against “unborn” individuals based
on characteristics such as race, sex, or disability, have thus far universally failed.99
Again, some have doubted this categorical characterization. In dissenting from
the denial of en banc rehearing in the Indiana case, Judge Easterbrook acknowl-
edged that no exceptions to the categorical rule against pre-viability abortion bans
had thus far been recognized.100 Yet, he argued, “Judges often said that employers could
fire workers for any or no reason. That’s the doctrine of employment at will. But by
the late twentieth century courts regularly created exceptions when the discharge was
based on race, sex, or disability.”101 Thus, in Judge Easterbrook’s view, since the
Supreme Court has never decided a case just like the one before the Court involving
a reason-based ban, one cannot assume Casey’s categorical language applies.102
Judge Easterbrook’s argument is an intriguing one, and it is one that may bring
the entire notion of a deliberative-privacy right into question. After all, the law often
regulates the reasons for which individuals may or may not take particular actions.
96 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464–65
(2018); cf. Shiffrin, supra note 60, at 860 (describing the harms of compelled speech).
97 Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 888
F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
879 (1992)).
98 294 F. Supp. 3d 746, 755 (S.D. Ohio 2018) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 879) (emphasis
added).
99 See supra Section I.A.
100 Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 917
F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 2018) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
101 Id. The State of Indiana had not asked the Seventh Circuit to rehear its appeal of the
decision striking down the ban on abortions for reasons of fetal anomaly—only a different pro-
vision of the abortion law regulating the disposition of fetal tissue. Thus, Judge Easterbrook
technically did not dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc with respect to the reason-
based ban.
102 Id.
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As he points out, the employment context is one area where the law picks and chooses
among acceptable and unacceptable reasons for an action.103 Why would it be for-
bidden to do so with respect to reasons for choosing abortion? The answer must be
that the abortion decision is protected by the Constitution, so the deliberative process
that leads up to it must also be protected.104 Similarly, the right of religious institu-
tions to choose their ministers is constitutionally protected; thus, the right to hire or
fire for any reason (notwithstanding the antidiscrimination laws highlighted by Judge
Easterbrook) must also be protected.
The right of secular employers to hire and fire employees, by contrast, is simply
a common-law right, not derived from any constitutional authority.105 It can be altered
at will by statutory or judicial fiat.106 Similarly, hate crime laws can regulate the
reasons for which individuals commit violent acts.107 The Supreme Court has upheld
such regulations against constitutional challenge, rejecting the notion that they
“punish bigoted thought.”108 Like the ability to fire employees at will, the ability to
engage in racially motivated violence is not protected by any constitutional right.
Perhaps, then, the deliberative-privacy right can best be understood as an aspect
of various already-recognized constitutional rights. Rather than a free-standing con-
stitutional right, the deliberative-privacy right may best be understood as the root or
core of several different rights. In each case—whether one considers the right to
speak, the right to make childbearing decisions, or the right of religious organiza-
tions to choose their leaders—it is the private deliberative process leading to the
protected decision that lies at the very center of the right, so fundamental that it must
be protected by a per se rule against government interference.109 But it is also mean-
ingful only in the context of a right or decision that is already protected by a con-
stitutional entitlement.110
103 Id.
104 Professor Carol Sanger has made the same argument with respect to abortion and manda-
tory ultrasound laws. Sanger, supra note 18, at 387.
105 In Hohfeldian terms, the ability of employers to fire employees at will is more of a
“privilege” than a “right,” i.e., an absence of a duty to abstain from the action. See Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 YALE L.J. 16, 32–33 (1914).
106 See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 917 F.3d at 536 (Easterbrook, J., dis-
senting); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Nichols, 229 F.2d 396, 399 (6th Cir. 1956) (finding the common-
law rights of an employer to hire and fire employees at will exists except to the extent it may
be modified by legislation or contract).
107 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012) (making it a federal crime to willfully cause or attempt
to cause “bodily injury to any person because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion,
or national origin of any person” (emphasis added)).
108 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484, 490 (1993).
109 Cf. Sanger, supra note 18, at 387–89 (arguing that not only the abortion decision but also
the path to reaching that decision is protected, and analogizing to religious belief and to voting).
110 Id.
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In light of this possibility, one might conceive of the categorical nature of the
deliberative-privacy right in a slightly different way than I have outlined above. It
might be a more correct understanding of the deliberative-privacy right to say that
it is not actually categorical or protected by a per se rule. After all, if the deliberative-
privacy right is not subject to balancing or provisos, it is something of an aberration
in constitutional doctrine. A more sensible approach might be to say that each of the
tests normally applied in each area of the law described in this Article—free exercise
of religion, free speech, and abortion rights—inevitably leads to the same result that
a per se rule would yield. Because the right to deliberate and arrive at one’s personal
decisions without government interference is at the core of several constitutional
provisions, any law that infringes on deliberative privacy will always strike at the
very core of the constitutional provision at issue, constituting a burden so significant
that it cannot be outweighed by any government interests. Because it strikes at the
core of the constitutional provision, any balancing test will result in the law being
found unconstitutional.
Thus, any application of strict scrutiny will find that a requirement on private
individuals to carry a state-sponsored ideological message can never serve a suffi-
ciently compelling government interest. As Wooley pointed out, such a requirement
can only be tailored to a governmental interest in “disseminat[ing] an ideology,” and
this government interest will never be weighty enough to counterbalance the individ-
ual’s interest in avoiding the dignitary and mental harm that arises from being forced
to foster a message with which one disagrees.111 When considering whether churches
must conform their hiring practices to antidiscrimination laws, one might reason that
the government never has a sufficiently compelling interest in deciding who should
lead a religious organization—even if the religious organization’s hiring practices
(such as the Catholic Church’s prohibition on female priests) might otherwise con-
stitute racial or gender discrimination. Finally, under the undue burden framework,
a reason-based ban on abortion will always fail. If the central question that the undue
burden framework is meant to answer is whether a law prevents a woman from making
the ultimate decision whether or not to carry her (pre-viability) pregnancy to term,
then a reason-based abortion ban (like any abortion ban) will always prevent her from
making the ultimate decision. Instead, it dictates the outcome of her deliberation. In
this sense, then, the per se rule protecting the deliberative-privacy right is simply a
short cut—a way of avoiding a doctrinal analysis that is likely to be straightforward
and reach a result that was apparent from the outset.
B. Expansionist Tendencies
In addition to its strong constitutional protection in the form of a per se rule, the
deliberative-privacy right possesses a second notable characteristic. It has a tendency
111 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (White, J., dissenting in part).
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to expand. The structure of this right is such that litigants have a tremendous incen-
tive to assert it, for the reasons discussed below. And the more litigants assert a given
claim, the more likely that some courts may eventually accept it. At the same time,
however, there is a risk that this expansionist tendency may ultimately work to
undermine the right.
The tendency of deliberative-privacy claims to expand is most visible in the
First Amendment context, with respect to both free speech and religious freedom.
For example, several scholars have recently observed that First Amendment doctrine
seems to be expanding its coverage with respect to what is considered protected free
speech, such that claims previously considered meritless or even laughable may now
have a decent chance of succeeding.112 Thus, litigants have argued that the prohibition
on compelled speech “limits the ability of the Securities and Exchange Commission
to mandate financial disclosures, restricts the power of regulatory agencies to compel
disclosure of conflicts of interest in the pharmaceutical industry, . . . [and] prohibits
the government from requiring employers to inform employees of their legal rights.”113
Most recently, in 2018, the Supreme Court cast extreme doubt on the ability of gov-
ernments to require organizations that provide pregnancy-related services to disclose
factual information about the availability of free, government-provided healthcare
services, opining that one such requirement compelled speech in violation of the
First Amendment.114 Although the Court in that case applied strict scrutiny, describing
the compelled disclosure as content-based115 but not ideological, the plaintiff organiza-
tion insisted in its brief that it was being forced to espouse ideas it found morally
objectionable116 and urged the explicit adoption of a per se rule “that the government
can never mandate or suppress speech based on an ideological disagreement.”117
Similarly, the ministerial exception seems to have exerted a magnetic force on
litigants, especially after the Supreme Court officially recognized this immunity in
Hosanna-Tabor.118 In some cases, litigants have attempted (unsuccessfully) to assert
112 Kendrick, supra note 25, at 1200; Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of
First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1629, 1633–34 (2015); see also
ZICK, supra note 28, at 10, 35.
113 Schauer, supra note 112, at 1614–15 (footnotes omitted).
114 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2370 (2018).
115 Id. at 2371.
116 Brief for Petitioners at 25, Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S.
Ct. 2361 (2018) (No. 16-1140), 2018 WL 347510, at *25 (arguing that the disclosure re-
quirement “creates duplicity of thought and mental conflict for Petitioners—requiring them
‘to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next’” and “to foster . . . an idea they find
morally objectionable”).
117 Id. at 57, 59–60 (arguing that “[a] per se rule has been a long time coming” and that
“[t]hough the level of scrutiny has never been decided, it operates as the functional equiva-
lent of a per se rule”).
118 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188
(2012) (noting that lower courts had previously recognized the ministerial exception, but that
the Supreme Court had not had occasion to do so).
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the ministerial exception as an affirmative cause of action to challenge government
regulation, rather than as a shield or defense against employment discrimination
claims.119 And in General Conference Corporation of Seventh-day Adventists v.
McGill, decided before Hosanna-Tabor but after several circuit courts had recog-
nized the ministerial exception, a church attempted to apply the exception to a
trademark infringement dispute between a church and its pastor.120 Long before
Hosanna-Tabor and long after it, moreover, litigants sought to apply the ministerial
exception to situations well outside the classic scenario of an employment dispute
between a religious organization and its minister. In one case, for example, a hos-
pital successfully claimed the exception to avoid an Americans with Disabilities Act
Claim by a resident in the hospital’s pastoral training program.121
The reproductive rights context has largely been an exception to this expansionist
trend. Few claims have been made for per se rules in the abortion context. As noted
above, however, at least one prominent scholar has argued, in apparently categorical
terms, for a prohibition on laws regulating the woman’s deliberative process in the
abortion context.122 This argument would suggest that mandatory ultrasound laws
and potentially many other state-mandated counseling requirements in the abortion
context would be unconstitutional—a conclusion that stands in contrast to existing
precedent almost universally upholding such requirements.123
There are likely several reasons for the tendency of deliberative-privacy claims
to expand beyond their original doctrinal bounds. Most obviously, a categorical rule
is highly advantageous to the party asserting it. Per se rules are clear-cut, thus re-
quiring little judicial discretion and entailing minimal uncertainty for the parties.124
Claims governed by per se rules are generally also less expensive to litigate. Since
no balancing of state interests against individual interests is required, minimal or no
fact discovery is necessary; if a claim is found to fall within the scope of a per se rule,
no factual questions remain and the case is generally over very quickly. Perhaps
equally importantly, the robust protection for First Amendment claims (both free
speech and religious freedom claims) provided by per se rules may be attractive to
both judges and litigants from either end of the political spectrum. First Amendment
claims, especially those invoking deliberative privacy, sound in individual liberty
119 Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 750 F.3d 184, 203 (2d Cir.
2014); Bus. Leaders in Christ v. Univ. of Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 3d 885, 904 (S.D. Iowa 2019).
120 617 F.3d 402, 408 (6th Cir. 2010) (“McGill asks us to create an exception to juris-
diction for situations in which ‘there is (1) religious use of (2) intellectual religious property
and the application of neutral principles could, in effect, (3) decide a doctrinal dispute and
(4) deprive one party the right to the free exercise of its religion.’” (citation omitted)).
121 Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 224–25 (6th Cir. 2007).
122 Supra note 104 and accompanying text.
123 See, e.g., EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 446 (6th Cir.
2019); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 738 (8th Cir. 2008)
(en banc). But cf. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014).
124 See Blocher, supra note 14, at 6–7.
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and autonomy—values that are important to progressives.125 But strong First Amend-
ment protections have also proven useful in striking down a variety of regulations
that are disfavored by businesses and by conservatives.126
Yet, some unintended consequences may arise from the embrace and expansion
of deliberative-privacy protections that demand the application of per se rules. Ulti-
mately, these consequences may undermine the strength of the deliberative-privacy
right. In particular, if a right is too powerful and threatens too many desirable gov-
ernment regulations, courts may feel pressure to find ways of cutting back on it.
Granting too much power to plaintiffs may undermine important government
interests and make courts question the value of the underlying right.
For example, if the ministerial exception were often used to defend blatantly
racially discriminatory hiring and firing decisions—against which there is likely
broad societal consensus—courts might become less comfortable defending a robust
deliberative-privacy right in this context. Similarly, it is arguable that reason-based
bans on abortion are designed to exploit concerns about sex, race, and disability
discrimination in order to generate support for cutting back on the abortion right.
The notion that courts are in some sense sanctioning eugenic abortion decisions, if
accepted by them may make courts increasingly uncomfortable with vindicating a
per se right to choose abortion before viability for any reason. Indeed, Justice Thomas’s
concurrence in the denial of certiorari in Box, the Indiana reason-based abortion ban
case, reflects precisely this anxiety about the use of abortion to select against a dis-
ability and argues that reason-based abortion bans would pass strict scrutiny.127
Moreover, given the simplicity and the strength of the per se rule protecting the
deliberative-privacy right, it might be anticipated that litigation may occur not over
the application of the rule but rather over its applicability, or scope. The result in a
ministerial exception case or a compelled speech may therefore hinge on whether
the discharged employee is actually a minister, or whether the particular conduct at
issue constitutes “speech” in a constitutional sense. In the abortion context, courts
may disagree over whether a law actually bans abortion for a particular reason, as
opposed to regulating it.128 Indeed, as Professor Joseph Blocher has demonstrated
125 See, e.g., Kendrick, supra note 25, at 1214 (“If the value underlying ‘the freedom of
speech’ is individual autonomy, employers and manufacturers may cast themselves as unwil-
ling speakers whose autonomy rights are being violated.”).
126 See Schauer, supra note 112, at 1626; Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1457 (2015).
127 Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1783 (2019) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
128 Cf. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health,
888 F.3d 300, 306 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[A]ccording to the State, Casey only recognized a pri-
vacy right in the binary decision of whether to bear or beget a child, but that right is not extended
to the decision to terminate a particular child.”), reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated,
727 F. App’x 208 (7th Cir. 2018), vacated, 917 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2018), and opinion rein-
stated, 917 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2018), and cert. granted in part, judgment rev’d in part sub
nom. Box, 139 S. Ct. 1780.
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with respect to bans—legal regulations that are often subject to per se rules—the
category of “ban” usually reflects a decision on the merits of a particular challenge
rather than any particular characteristics of the challenged law.129 In the end, courts
may find a way to limit the scope of the robust protection for deliberative privacy,
thus undermining the principle at the core of several constitutional provisions.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article has been to reveal a connection among several disparate-
seeming rights claims and to show how the thread of deliberative privacy connects
all of them. My contention is not that deliberative privacy is itself a freestanding
constitutional right, but rather that it is a concept at the core of several other consti-
tutional rights that sound in individual privacy and autonomy. This Article has not
made any prescriptive claims about how the right should be understood or whether
it should be made stronger or weaker. It does suggest, however, that consistent
recognition of the deliberative-privacy right would lead to courts protecting the right
through the application of a per se rule against government intervention in the private
deliberations leading to a constitutionally protected decision.
129 Blocher, supra note 14, at 25 (“One need not be a full-fledged legal realist to recognize
the possibility that the ban label is a conclusion of invalidity rather than a basis for it.”).
